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COLLATERAL ATTACK BY HABEAS CORPUS UPON
FEDERAL JUDGMENTS IN CRIMINAL CASES
FANx A. Pnuns*M ANY LAWYERS NEVER in their careers have occasion to employ
the writ of habeas corpus. It is only natural that there should
exist, even within the profession, widespread lack of knowledge about
the substantive rights guarded by this great engine of release and the
procedures involved in its use. This article is designed to demonstrate
the scope and manner of using the writ to attack criminal judgments
of sentence in federal cases.
The writ is an order of a court of law to an individual, the respond-
ent, requiring him to produce at a certain time and place the body of
a named person who is purportedly in the custody of the respondent.
Various forms of the writ were available at common law,' but habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum is the only form presently of importance.
*B.A., Umversity of Washington, 1940; LL.B., Umversity of Washington, 1946;
Member of the Washington Bar and Law Secretary to the Honorable Homer T. Bone
of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In the prepara-
tion of this manuscript I have received valuable assistance from Professor Ivan C.
Rutledge, of the University of Washington School of Law. I owe to my mentor, Judge
Homer T. Bone, a great debt for the help and inspiration he has given me in all things.
I Blackstone lists the following" ad respondendum (to remove a prisoner confined
under process of an inferior court and charge him with a new action m the court
above), ad satisfactendurn (to bring a prisoner up to some superior court to charge
lum with process of execution on a judgment there obtained), those ad prosequendum,
testificandun, deliberandum, etc. (to remove a prisoner m order to prosecute or bear
testimony in any court, or to be tried m the proper jurisdiction), including the common
writ ad factendurn et recipsendum (to remove a cause from some inferior jurisdiction
into the superior court), " but the great and efficacious writ, m all manner of
illegal confinement is that of habeas corpus ad subjic:endum a high, prerogative
writ." 3 IiqsT. 129-131. In 28 U. S. C. A. 377, the federal courts are given a general
power to issue writs not specifically provided for by statute.
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Originally known as the "great writ," it has usurped the position of
all the others and is now commonly referred to as "the writ of habeas
corpus." Its purpose was to inquire into the legality of the confine-
ment of the petitioner, but in early times that had a meaning quite
different from the meaning given to "legality" in present-day mvesti-
gations pursuant to the writ.2
Some writers trace the origin of the writ to the Romans, and others
believe that it is unique to Anglo-Saxon law 4 Known to the common
law even before the Magna Charta and enshrined in statute in 1679
by the famous Habeas Corpus Act, it crossed the Atlantic with the
British colonists and in America it has, since the beginning, been re-
garded as one of the most precious rights of free men. This regard was
expressed when the Constitution was drafted with the inclusion of the
provision that: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it." This was not a grant of power to the federal
courts but only a limitation on the powers of Congress,5 but in the
Judiciary Act of 1789' Congress gave to the courts of the United
States the power to inquire by habeas corpus into the legality of the
confinement of those imprisoned under the authority of the federal
government. The scope of the power has been successively extended
by statutory provisions culminating in the Act of 1867,1 and the law
2 Originally the writ seems to have been a device to put people into prison, but
somewhere it underwent a metamorphosis and came to be used against the king.
Jenks, The Story of Habeas Corpus, 18 L. QUART. REV. 64 (1902).
3 W W Howe, STUDIES IN CIVIL LAW 54 (1905).
4 2 Pollock and Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 584 (1905).
5 In re Barry, 42 Fed. 113, 122 (1844). However, it was asserted in Prigg v. Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, 41 U. S. 539 (1842) that Congress has the power to
provide for habeas corpus and to give the courts power to issue the writ.
6 "That all the before mentioned courts shall have power to issue writs of scire
facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not especially provided for by statute, which
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to
the principles and usages of law, and that either of the Justices of the Supreme
Court, as well as the Judges of the District Courts shall have power to grant writs
of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of the commitment:
Provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in jail
unless they are in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States,
or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be
brought into court to testify." 1 STAT. 81.
7 This Act conferred upon the several courts of the United States and their justices
and judges " power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person
may be restrained of his or her liberty, in violation of the Constitution, or of any
treaty, or law of the United States." 14 STAT. 385. Such power was in addition to
other amendments to the Judiciary Act of 1789, adding power to inquire into state con-
finement (1833) and confinement of aliens under "the law of nations" (1842). 4 STAT.
634, 5 STAT. 539. These statutes were subsequently amended in minor details, but the
provisions remain substantially the same. See 28 U. S. C. A. 377, 451 et seq., Walker
v. Johnson, 312 U. S. 275, 285 (1941), Ex parte Yerger, 75 U. S. 85 (1869).
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governing its exercise has been continuously broadened since that time
by decisions of the Supreme Court," until it has been said that it "is
available, not only to determine points of jurisdiction, stricti juris, and
constitutional questions; but whenever else resort to it is necessary to
prevent a complete miscarriage of justice."'
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
Although the writ has a variety of uses in connection with detention
prior to judgment, or involving state action or action by admnnistra-
tive officers,' 0 its employment to attack a judgment in a criminal case
was considered in an early opinion,' written by Chief Justice Marshall
for the Supreme Court. Holding that English jurisprudence is "to a
8 For a discussion of the background of these changes, see Frank v. Mangum, 237
U. S. 309 (1915), In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1 (1890), McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131(1934), Ex parte Craig, 282 Fed. 138 (C. C. A. 2d 1922) , Ex parte Rosier, 133 F. (2d)
316 (App. D. C. 1942).9 judge Learned Hand, in U. S. ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F. (2d) 811
(C. C. A. 2d 1946).10 Setting aside the action of a state court is a serious interference with the
sovereignty of the state, and special rules developed by the Supreme Court limit such
power in the federal courts. See Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179 (1906), Ex parte
Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1944), Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935), Williams
v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945), White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1945), House v.
Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1945), Rice v. Olsen, 324 U. S. 786 (1945). Three of the main
branches of review by habeas corpus of administrative action are those connected
with deportation, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135 (1945), Asakura v. Seattle,
265 U. S. 342 (1924), Kumanomido v. Nagle, 40 F.(2d) 42 (C. C. A. 9th 1930),
Selective Service, e.g., Estep v. U. S., 327 U. S. 114 (1946), Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S.
283 (1944), Bagley v. Vice, 151 F.(2d) 700 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), Sullivan v.
Swatzka, 148 F.(2d) 965 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), and mental hospitals, e.g., Overholser v.
Treibly, 147 F.(2d) 705 (App. D. C. 1945), Howard v. Overholser, 130 F.(2d) 429
(App. D. C. 1942). Another type of admnistrative action, which is likewise outside
the scope of this article, is action applicable to parole matters and "good conduct"
allowances under a valid judgment, or pursuant to a properly granted pardon. Statu-
tory credits for good behavior are mandatory, and the same may be said for the
effect of a pardon. Carroll v. Squier, 136 F. (2d) 571 (C. C. A. 9th 1943), cert. dented,
320 U. S. 793 (1943), Tippit v. Squier, 145 F.(2d) 211 (C. C. A. 9th 1944), Cox v.
McConnell, 80 F.(2d) 258 (C. C. A. 5th 1935), Clark v. Surprenant, 94 F.(2d) 969
(C. C. A. 9th 1938), Flatek v. Aderhold, 73 F.(2d) 173 (C. C. A. 5th 1934),
Pagliaro v. Cox, 143 F.(2d) 900 (C. C. A. 8th 1944), Carroll v. Zerbst, 76 F.(2d)
961 (C. C. A. 10th 1935), and the annotation at 148 A. L. R. 1243. As to parole
matters, see Kirk v. Squier, 150 F.(2d) 3 (C. C. A. 9th.1945) and the cases there
cited. On pardons, see Lupo v. Zerbst, 92 F. (2d) 362 (C. C. A. 5th 1937), cert. dented,
303 U. S. 46 (1938), Stroud v. Johnston, 139 F.(2d) 171 (C. C. A. 9th 1943),
Morgan v. Aderhold, 73 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 5th 1934), and the Platek case, supra.
This use of habeas corpus to review prison administration might very well be extended
to a yet unexplored field. If, for example, a prisoner were strung up by his thumbs,
or kept in solitary confinement under a sentence to confinement in the customary
manner, could the court mquire into the "legality" of the confinement? See Stroud v.
Johnston, supra, and compare the Constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments. U. S. CoNsT. AmEim. VIII. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.(2d) 443, 155
A. L. R. 143 (C. C. A. 6th 1944) supports tius view. See the annotation in A. L. R.
But Snow v. Roche, 143 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 9th 1944), cert. dented, 323 U. S. 788(1944), holds that the discipline of the prison is not reviewable by habeas corpus.
%E x parte Watkins, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 193 (1830). See also 26 U. S. C. A. 453.
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considerable degree incorporated into our own," he announced the
following rule: "This writ is in the nature of a writ of error which
brings up the body of the prisoner with the cause of commitment.
An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that
judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has
general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous."
It is clear that the contrast between erroneous and void is phrased in
terms of jurisdiction or no jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, then, is the turn-
ing point of inquiry by habeas corpus into illegal detention under a
judgment. Whether a court is de facto or de jure is not a jurisdictional
question in this sense."
One of the primary requisites of jurisdiction lies in the relationship
of the parties to the court. If the court rendering the judgment has
no jurisdiction over the parties, then its judgment is void and may be
set aside at any time. The first step then is to determine whether the
sentencing court had jurisdiction over the person, the place, and the
act concerned. If we assume that the person is not the representative
of a foreign government," the question of geographical jurisdiction
arises. Did the court which rendered the judgment have jurisdiction
over the place where the criminal act was committed? It is clear that
the courts of the United States, state or federal, ordinarily have no
jurisdiction over crimes committed in China. " By the same token,
whether the federal court had jurisdiction in many cases depends upon
whether the crime was committed within an area where the jurisdic-
tion of the United States is exclusive (an Indian reservation, 5 a
national park," or an army post,' etc.) or at a place within the juris-
diction of a state.
Conceding that the petitioner may not ordinarily retry the question
of fact as to where the crime was committed,"8 another court may still
12 McDowell v. U. S., 159 U. S. 596 (1895), It re Ah Lee, 5 Fed. 899 (D. C. D.
Ore. 1880) Ex parte Ward, 173 U. S. 452 (1899).
18 See the interesting historical discussion in Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 Fed. 577,
38 L. R. A. 405 (C. C. A. 2d 1895), Horn v. Mitchell, 232 Fed. 819 (C. C. A. 1st
1916), dismissed on appeal, 243 U. S. 247 (1917).
14 Excepting conspiracies intended to affect activities or things within the United
States.
35 Hatten v. Hudspeth, 99 F.(2d) 501 (C. C. A. 10th 1938), Davis v. Johnston,
144 F.(2d) 862 (C. C. A. 9th 1944).
le Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19 (1939).
17 Rogers v. Squier, 157 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
18 In the extraordinary case where injustice is clearly apparent, it is by no means
certain that the petitioner would not be permitted to retry the issue of fact as to where
the crime occurred. Bowen v. Johnston, supra note 16, Kulick v. Kennedy, supra
note 9.
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apply the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus when the need
for it is apparent and where only a question of law is involved." If
the geographical limits of a reservation turn upon the construction
of a statute, or if the court is called upon to determine whether the
state has retained criminal jurisdiction over land ceded to the federal
government, 0 the remedy of the writ is available to try those issues.
If the indictment or information does not charge a crime against the
United States, the trial court is without jurisdiction and its judgment
is void.2'
An interesting attempt to apply this principle was recently made in
the case of Hart v. Squzer 2 2 The defendant, a narcotic addict, had
gone to a doctor, given an assumed name, and procured a prescription
for drugs. A druggist filled the prescription and the defendant was
indicted for uttering a false, forged writing with the intent of defraud-
mg the United States.23 He pleaded guilty, was sentenced, and, after
serving a portion of lns term, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that the indictment did not charge a crime within the
statute, since the prescription was genuine and was therefore not a
forged writing. The court rejected his contention but only with some
difficulty Similar reasomng, at another time and in another case, where
the facts alleged do not clearly come within any statute, or where a
penal statute is unconstitutional,2 ' may well be successful.
The constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy may well be
considered at this point.25 Some courts have held that a failure to
9 Walsh v. Archer, 73 F.(2d) 197 (C. C. A. 9th 1934), Walsh v. Johnston, 115
F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 9th 1940), Bowen v. Johnston, supra note 16; Davis v. Johnston,
supra note 15.20 Rogers v. Squier, supra note 17
21 For an excellent discussion see Van Gardener v. Johnston, 87 F. (2d) 654
(C. C. A. 9th 1937), McNealy v. Johnston, 100 F.(2d) 280 (C. C. A. 9th 1938).
In holding some indictments proof against attack via habeas corpus, courts have
intimated that appeal was the proper remedy. This rule is historical in origin and
under modern rules of practice the distinction is losing any practical effect. Cf. Moore
v. Aderhold, 108 F.(2d) 729 (C. C. A. 2d 1939). If an indictment or information be
so vague and uncertain that the defendant cannot tell of what he is accused, he may
rely on his right " to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. i
U. S. CoxsT. AMEzq. VI See White v. Levine, 40 F.(2d) 502 (C. C. A. 10th 1930),
Brown v. White, 24 F.(2d) 392 (C. C. A. 8th 1928).
22159 F.(2d) 639 (C. C. A. 9th 1947).
2818 U. S. C. A. 72.24Audett v. Johnston, 142 F.(2d) 739 (C. C. A. 9th 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S.
743 (1944), Novothy v. Ragen, 88 F.(2d) 72, 74 (C. C. A. 7th 1937), Ex parte
Hatem, 38 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 6th 1930).
25Though similar, the statute of limitations is probably not grounds for the writ.
See Wallace v. Hunter, 149 F.(2d) 59 (C. C. A. 10th 1945), U. S. ex rel. Hassell
v. Mathues, 27 F.(2d) 137 (E. D. Penn. 1928), Strewl v. Sanford, 151 F.(2d) 648
(C. C. A. 5th 1945). Nor will an objection that the statute under which the petitioner
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assert the defense at the trial waives the right altogether,26 and it
would follow, therefore, that it could not be asserted through habeas
corpus.2" But this interpretation seems incorrect in principle, for if
the indictment charges the same offense as has been previously pressed
against the accused, then the court is acting contrary to the constitu-
tion from the very beginning---4.e., the court is without jurisdiction
from the very beginning. Moreover, there are no practical considera-
tions which would require a contrary rule, for this is something that
appears of record and is purely a matter of law Therefore, the better
if not universally accepted view is that upon a showing of double
jeopardy the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court in the beginning is
established and the writ is the proper remedy to set aside the judg-
ment.2" Of course if the issue had been raised and decided by the trial
court, its decision, if not conclusive upon the later application for
habeas corpus, would be given great weight.2"
A related problem is inherent in the recent decision in Ballard v.
United States."0 The Supreme Court there reversed the lower court
and ordered an indictment dismissed on the ground that the indict-
ment was void because women had been systematically excluded from
the panel from which the grand jury was chosen. A similar decision
had been rendered before as to the petit jury from which wage earners
had been excluded."' Do these decisions mean that all indictments by
such grand juries are votd? On the basis of recorded decision, no,
because the courts have held that habeas corpus would not lie where
Negroes were improperly excluded from the jury panel, on the ground
that by failing to object at the trial and upon appeal, the petitioner
had waived any right he might have.2 However, the language used in
the Ballard case would seem to indicate a contrary viewpoint. More-
was convicted had been repealed prior to his trial serve to defeat the judgment,
although this result seems incorrect on principle. Petrai v. Archer, 8 F.(2d) 354
(C. C. A. 9th 1925).
28U. S. v. Mulligan, 67 F.(2d) 321 (C. C. A. 2d 1933), Brady v. U. S., 24
F.(2d) 399 (C. C. A. 8th 1928), Levin v. U. S., 5 F.(2d) 598 (C. C. A. 9th 1925).
27 Bracey v. Zerbst, 93 F. (2d) 8 (C. C. A. 10th 1937), Graham v. Squier, 53 F
Supp. 881 (W D. Wash. 1944), affirmed (on another ground), 145 F.(2d) 348(C. C. A. 9th 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 845 (1945).
28 Clawans v. Rives, 104 F. (2d) 240 (App. D. C. 1939), Bens v. U. S., 266 Fed.
152 (C. C. A. 2d 1920), cert. denied, 254 U. S. 634 (1920).
29 See note 21, supra, and Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224 (1924).
30 329 U. S. 187 (1946).
s' Thiel v. So. Pac. R. R., 328 U. S. 217 (1946).
32 Carruthers v. Reed, 102 F. (2d) 933 (C. C. A. 8th 1939), cert. deied, 307 U. S.
643 (1939), Cf. Hale v. Crawford, 65 F.(2d) 739 (C. C. A. 1st 1933), cert. denied,
290 U. S. 674 (1933).
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over, in Bell v. U.S.," one defendant did not attack the jury panel, but
upon appeal the indictment was dismissed even as to him upon the
authority of the Ballard case, thus indicating that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals felt that he had not waived the issue by failing to
assert it in the district court. If the defendant did not waive his right
by failing to assert it at his trial, then it would always be available to
him, even by a later application for a writ of habeas corpus.
So far no petitions, based upon these grounds, have been presented
to the federal courts, but in view of the fact that there are a number
of convicts who were indicted by such juries, either in Washington or
in Califorma, the Supreme Court will probably have to answer that
question eventually "
Other cases, closely related in form, but vastly different in principle,
require the same close scrutiny of the indictment. Where an indict-
ment contains more than one count, of which only some are valid, and
the defendant is convicted and sentenced upon all counts, the sentenc-
ing court has jurisdiction, but has, at most, only used its power ex-
cessively22 Tins situation is entirely different from that discussed
above, for the power to issue the writ here springs from the concept
that the confinement is contrary to law rather than that the trial court
was without jurisdiction. This has led many courts to remark "that
mqury by habeas corpus is limited to the present legality of the con-
finement."2 ' From this distinction it follows that the writ will not issue
22 159 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 9th 1947).
24 "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime
unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury. " U. S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
An infamous crime is one pumshable by imprisonment of more than one year. It follows,
therefore, that if the prisoner were convicted upon an information rather than an
mdictment, his freedom might possibly be obtained by habeas corpus unless his petition
is barred by waiver at the trial. When the court amends the indictment, without the
grand jury, the judgment is void and habeas corpus will lie. Ex parte Barn, 121 U. S.
1 (1887).
25 Pyle v. Johnston, 137 F.(2d) 869 (C. C. A. 9th 1943). See the interesting case
where the trial court unposed sentences which were less than the legal mimmum upon
each of the last two counts and the prisoner was released after serving the valid
sentence under the first count. Copeland v. Archer, 50 F.(2d) 836 (C. C. A. 9th
1931). Cf. Cottrell v. Sanford, 123 F.(2d) 75 (C. C. A. 5th 1941), cert. denied, 316
U. S. 684 (1942).86McDonald v. Johnston, 149 F.(2d) 768 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), McNally v. Hill,
293 U. S. 131 (1934), De Maurez v. Squier, 121 F.(2d) 960, 962 (C. C. A. 9th 1941).
Cf. Wong v. Esola, 6 F. (2d) 828 (C. C. A. 9th 1925) where there were admitted
illegalities in the arrest and commitment, but on the hearing the government showed
sufficient grounds for detention. Note also that when a recaptured prisoner is con-
victed of the crime of escaping, habeas corpus will not secure lus release on the
ground that he was originally detained under a void sentence. Bayless v. U. S., 141
F.(2d) 578 (C. C. A. 9th 1944), reversed (on other grounds), 150 F.(2d) 236
(C. C. A. 9th 1945).
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if the sentence given be a general one, and the total of the authorized
sentences upon the valid counts is equal to or exceeds the actual sen-
tence,"7 or if petitioner was sentenced upon each count and the sen-
tences upon the valid counts have not yet been served. In any event.
the excessive sentence is void only as to the excess, and the writ will
never issue until so much of the sentence as was properly imposed is
served. 8
As to the matters discussed above, the rules are fairly clear and the
decisions in substantial accord. However, the third theoretical basis
(where the trial court has proceeded to judgment in violation of the
accused's fundamental constitutional rights) for issuing the writ is not
so well understood. The task of setting the bench marks in this devious
and uncertain field has kept the Supreme Court busy for the past few
years and will occupy its time for many years more.8" The Constitution
set down in the first ten amendments certain limitations upon the
powers of the federal government-guarantees of certain individual
rights-and those limitations are binding upon the federal courts. It
follows that when a federal court, having jurisdiction in the beginning,
proceeds to judgment in a manner which violates one or more of the
constitutional rights of the accused, the court loses jurisdiction and its
judgment is void---i.e., subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.
This interesting and original doctrine had its birth in the case of
Johnston v. Zerbst.40 In that case, two men were indicted for passing
counterfeit money and they were arraigned, tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced in a single day While confined in a federal penitentiary pur-
suant to that sentence, they sought a writ of habeas corpus and at the
hearing upon the writ it developed that they had been without funds.
of little education, and far from their friends and relatives at the time
of the trial. They had made no request to the trial judge for counsel
and none had represented them. It appeared that the trial court had
jurisdiction originally and the district court denied the writ on the
ground that "depriving petitioner of his constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel was not sufficient to make the judgment void and
justify its annulment in a habeas corpus proceeding, but was only a
trial error to be corrected upon appeal." The circuit court of appeals
• Ex parte De Bara, 179 U. S. 316 (1900), Barkdoll v. U. S., 147 F.(2d) 617
(C. C. A. 9th 1945).
38 Supra, notes 36 and 37 Compare the situations indicated in note 10.3 9 The Supreme Court has written over thirty opinions on this subject in the past
ten years.
40 304 U. S. 458 (1938).
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affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the writ of
habeas corpus had been so liberalized by the Act of Congress" as to
provide:
a judicial inquiry in a court of the United States into the very truth and
substance of the causes of his [petitioner's] detention, although it may be
necessary to look behind and beyond the record of his conviction [and
that] Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged
with a crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional
mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty. When this right is
properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a necessary element
of the court's jurisdiction to proceed to a conviction and sentence. If the
accused however, is not represented by counsel and has not competently
and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment
stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving
him of his life or his liberty A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial
may be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to failure to complete
the court-as the Sixth Amendment requires-by providing counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived
this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no
longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced
by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder
may obtain release by habeas corpus.'2
This decision opened a Pandora's box from which an ever-increasing
flood of cases flows, for it is but a step from this language to the propo-
sition that the violation of any constitutional right during the course
of a trial would render the judgment void. As we shall see, the rule
does not extend that far, but in. attempting to limit its application the
courts have reached conflicting and confusing conclusions.
In sending the case back for findings of fact upon the issue. of
waiver, the Supreme Court recognized that the rights guaranteed by
the first ten amendments to the Constitution were personal rights
given to the individual which he could relinquish if he chose and then
proceeded to define that relinquishment in the' following terms:
It has been pointed out that the "courts indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights and that we
"do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." A waiver
ts ordinarily an sntentional relinquishment or abandonment 'of a known
right or prvilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelli-
4' Act of 1867, supra note 7
42 Supra, note 40, at pp. 466-468.
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gent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused This protecting
duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge
of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the
accused. While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there
is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it
would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the
record. 4' (Author's italics)
But the court went further and pointed out that "When collaterally
attacked, the judgment of a court carries with it a presumption of
regularity" It follows, therefore, that the petitioner is presumed to
have waived any infraction of his constitutional rights during Is trial
where he has either pleaded guilty or failed to object upon appeal,"
unless the petitioner can show some disability, either physical or men-
tal, which prevented him from making an intelligent, intentional re-
linquishment of his rights.
Although the fact of waiver should appear affirmatively in the record
where possible, it is not absolutely essential that it so appear," nor
does the fact that it does so appear in the record necessarily preclude
the petitioner from later denying any waiver. Rather the fact of an
intelligent and understanding waiver must be apparent from all the
facts and circumstances of the trial."8 Even these matters are not en-
tirely free from doubt and occasional thoughts expressed in dissenting
or concurring opinions seem to indicate that the proper rule is not so
certain as one would like it to be."7 With that observation let us pass
on to an examination of the fundamental constitutional rights already
referred to, and there we can consider at greater length, if necessary,
any additional problems of waiver that may be specifically related to
a particular right.
Since the other amendments do not concern this phase of habeas
corpus, we are here concerned with only three:' Amendments Four,
43 Ibid., p. 464.
44 Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945), Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945)
Dainard v. Johnston, 149 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), Michener v. Johnston, 141
F.(2d) 171 (C. C. A. 9th 1944), 146 F.(2d) 129 (C. C. A. 9th 1944), O'Keith v.
Johnston, 129 F.(2d) 889 (C. C. A. 9th 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 680 (1942),
Walker v. Chitty, 112 F(2d) 79 (C. C. A. 9th 1940).
45Widmer v. Johnston, 136 F.(2d) 416 (C. C. A. 9th 1943), cert. denied, 320
U. S. 780 (1943).46 House v. Mayo, supra, note 10; Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485 (1944),
Walker v. Johnston, supra, note 7, cases cited supra, note 44.
47 E.g., Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173 (1946).
48 See the reference to the Eighth Amendment in note 10, supra. The other Amend-
ments are not concerned with matters affecting the use of the writ.
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Five, and Six. Amendment Four provides protection from unreason-
able searches and seizures and limits the use of search warrants.
Amendment Five provides for indictment by Grand Jury, 9 and se-
curity from double jeopardy, self-incrimnation and convictions with-
out due process of law. Amendment Six guarantees to the accused a
speedy public trial by jury, the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, the right to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, the right to have compulsory process to secure the at-
tendance of witnesses for the defense, and the right to have counsel
to assist in the defense. This is a total of twelve separate "rights," a
violation of any one of which in the course of a trial may very well
be sufficient to destroy the jurisdiction of the trial court and render
void the judgment of conviction. For simplicity let us deal with these
rights generally save where individual treatment will serve to clarify
matters, placing emphasis upon what sort of violations will be sufficient
grounds for a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus.
The most significant of the rights referred to above is that con-
tamed in the Fifth Amendment providing that no person shall "be de-
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law" This
same phrase is contained in the Fourteenth Amendment and its mean-
ing, a long-time subject of controversy, has recently received an illunn-
nating discussion with extended citation of authorities.10 It has many
times been confused with the total sum of the rights guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights, that is, as a sort of shorthand reference to the items
specifically enumerated above. But it is less than that and more. It has
its own independent function and is not part and parcel of the other
rights guaranteed, but rather serves to prohibit "the incarceration of
one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of
fairness and right.""1 Thus where the threat of mob violence dominates
a trial5 2 or where the prosecution knowingly employs perjured testi-
mony to obtain a conviction,"' or where the judge or jury can be shown
to have been prejudiced that a "fair" trial was impossible, so that
although the proceedings were fair upon their face, the whole pro-
40 See note 34, supra.
50 Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Louisiana ex tel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U. S. 459 (1946).51 Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 473 (1941).
52Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1922), Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F. (2d) 586
(C. C. A. 5th 1931).
58 White v. Ragen, supra, note 10; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213 (1942), Mooney
v. Holohan, mpra, note 10; Hall v. Johnston, 91 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A. 9th 1937).
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ceedings were a sham and a farce of justice,"' then the requirement of
due process stands as a jurisdictional bar to the whole proceeding.
Where another of the guaranteed rights is invaded, however, it is
not necessarily grounds for the writ. In many cases the courts have
required that the infraction be so serious that the violation could be
said to have deprived the petitioner of due process of law Obviously
one who is denied representation by counsel, or who is denied a speedy
public trial by jury, is being denied that due process of law guaranteed
by the constitution, for in federal courts such rights are requisite to
due process." However, some minor infraction of one of these consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights will not violate our concept of due process,
and failing that many courts generally hold that the writ will not lie.
Their reasoning in reaching this result is not always entirely clear and
may be based upon implied waiver, a lack of prejudice, or the idea
that the error can only be reached upon appeal, but the true tenor of
these opinions was accurately stated by Judge Miller speaking for the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia when he said.
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court in the Bowen case and
in other recent cases, intended to say that the writ of habeas corpus is
available, not only when jurisdiction is lost during the course of the pro-
ceeding by deprivation of a constitutional right, but also whenever a peti-
tioner is able to allege that he failed to enjoy a constitutional right. We see
no reason to impute such an intention to the Supreme Court. A careful
reading of its opinions will show that it is not the purpose of the writ to
compel or require enjoyment of constitutional rights in all cases where, for
example, they have been waived, intelligently, by the petitioner himself, or
for him by counsel. The applicable rule has been well stated by Judge
Parker- "Ordinarily, failure to raise a constitutional question during trial
amounts to a waiver thereof [United States v. Brady, 4 Cir. 133 F(2d)
476, 481] and only where failure to raise the question at the trial was due
to ignorance, duress or other reason for which petitioner should not be held
responsible may resort be had to habeas corpus in the federal courts, and
even in these cases, only where it is made to appear that there has been
such gross violation of constitutional right as to deny to the prisoner the
substance of a fair trial and thus oust the court of jurisdiction to impose
sentence." 58
04 Payment of extra fees to "expert" witnesses for the government does not violate
due process. Walker v. Squier, 139 F.(2d) 28 (C. C. A. 9th 1943), cert. dented, 321
U. S. 792 (1943). But financial interest of the court in a share of the fines does. Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1926).
53 The due process clause is most generally employed in collateral attacks by habeas
corpus on judgments of state courts. Where federal judgments are concerned it is
generally used jointly with the violation of some specific right guaranteed in the first
ten Amendments.56 Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.(2d) 857, 872 (App., D. C. 1945).
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With due respect to Judge Miller, the above generalization is not en-
tirely accurate. The breach of certain of these rights is so serious that
there is no necessity to show prejudice, and on occasion convictions
winch seem to be eminently fair and just will be set aside. Moreover,
the language of the Supreme Court cases would seem to indicate that
violation of any specifically guaranteed right would be, without more,
sufficient reason to set aside a judgment of conviction. For this reason
the provisions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and those of the
Sixth Amendment must be considered separately, with special atten-
tion to the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling any person in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. Not every infraction is
so fundamental as to strike at the jurisdiction of the trial court, and
the admission of his selective service questionnaire in evidence against
the accused 7 or his being compelled to walk before the jury so they
could observe him does not go to the jurisdiction of the court. " But
where a confession of guilt is procured by third-degree methods such
as beatings," threats,"0 or prolonged questioning,8 no valid conviction
can be based upon it.
The leading case on this matter is Waley v. Johnston," decided by
the Supreme Court in 1942. There the petitioner alleged that he had
pleaded guilty at his trial because a named member of the F.B.I. had
threatened that he would incite the public against the petitioner and
cause him to be hanged if he did not plead guilty The district court
demed the petition as msufficient upon its face and was affirmed by
the Circuit Court of Appeals, but the Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing" that if the petitioner could establish these allegations as true,
then his conviction was void and he was entitled to his freedom, even
though the proof of the matter was entirely outside the knowledge and
record of the trial court. The court went on to say that "a conviction
on a plea of guilty coerced by a federal law enforcement officer is no
more consistent with due process than a conviction supported by a
coerced confession." 8 Although the right here involved is really the
57 Graham v. Squier, supra, note 27.
as Matter of Moran, 203 U. S. 96, 105 (1906).
50 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1935).
60 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1941).
6 McNabb v. U. S., 318 U. S. 332 (1942), Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227
(1939).
62 Supra, note 60.
68 Ibid., p. 104.
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right against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court in its opinion does
not even mention the phrase but places the case upon the ground that
such a conviction is not "consistent with due process" and refers to
Chambers v. Florida, 6 where a state conviction was assailed upon
appeal because it was based upon a confession secured by third-degree
methods. There the reversal had to be based upon an invasion of the
right to "due process" as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
This treatment by the Supreme Court lends support to Judge
Miller's view, and it would seem to be safe to say that an infringement
of the right of the accused not to bear witness against himself will only
go to the jurisdiction of the court when the infraction is so funda-
mental as to render the whole proceedings a farce and a mockery of
justice.
The guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures is intimately connected with the right against
self-incrimination and with the concept of due process of law 6 Per-
sonal papers of the accused taken in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, for example, could not be introduced against the accused without
forcing him to give evidence against himself. But the rights guaranteed
in each case are personal rights and they are normally held to be
waived where they are not asserted at the trial and upon appeal."
However, if the petitioner can overcome the burden of proof and show
that he did not waive his constitutional right, for reason of ignorance
or disability, then the writ of habeas corpus will lie.
A careful distinction must be made between the situation where the
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the confes-
sion secured by coercion is not introduced in evidence at the trial and
where it is a material element in securing the conviction. Where the
conviction does not rest on the prohibited matter, then the breach of
the constitutional right is not grounds for habeas corpus. Thus though
a confession be secured by third-degree methods, if the accused later
voluntarily pleads guilty and the confession is never introduced at the
trial, the judgment of conviction is good and a writ will not lie."7 The
64 Supra, note 61.
685 Brain v. U. S., 168 U. S. 532 (1897).
68 Price v. Johnston, 125 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 9th 1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S.
677 (1941), Bozel v. Hudspeth, 126 F.(2d) 585 (C. C. A. 10th 1942), Moore v.
Aderhold, supra, note 21, Hampson v. Smith, 153 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A. 9th 1945).
67 Waley v. Johnston, 139 F.(2d) 117 (C. C. A. 9th 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S.
779 (1944), Blood v. Hunter, 150 F.(2d) 640 (C. C. A. 10th 1945), Widmer v.
Johnston, supra, note 45.
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same should be true where evidence secured in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is never introduced at the trial of the accused.
The rights secured under the Sixth Amendment are not afforded as
broad protection as those under the Fifth, for a "criminal prosecu-
tion" is somewhat narrower in meaning than "in any criminal case,"
but the distinction is not significant in our limited inquiry Moreover,
in the matters we are discussing certain considerations are substan-
tially similar in respect to infringement of each of the guaranteed
rights, such as the matter of waiver and the element of the time the
infraction took place, and, except as detailed below, a plea of guilty
or a failure to assert his rights (by one who knows of them) impliedly
waives those rights. Most infractions fall within this class and the
limitation serves to bar many applications for habeas corpus.
As to the time element, it is clear that the accused need not be
present at the grand jury hearings under either the Fifth or the Sixth
Amendments, 9 nor are any of Ins constitutional rights prejudiced by
any procedure at a preliminary proceeding since that is not constitu-
tionally required in any event.6" Furthermore, since there is no consti-
tutional right to an appeal,10 the inquiry by the writ of habeas corpus
is limited to what occurred up to judgment and sentence. This severe
limitation of the scope of the inquiry had not been acquiesced in by
all courts,7' but it is certainly most sound on principle and is the view
supported by a legion of authority
The right to be confronted by adverse witnesses is not of great im-
portance so far as collateral attack on the judgment is concerned. 2
The requirements of speedy and public trial by an inpartial jury8
0s U. S. v. Thompson, 144 F.(2d) 604 (C. C. A. 2d 1944), cert. demed, 323 U. S.
790 (1944).69 Burall v. Johnston, 146 F.(2d) 230 (C. C. A. 9th 1944).
To Luckenbach v. U. S., 272 U. S. 533, 536 (1926), Cobbledich v. U. S., 309 U. S.
323, 325 (1939), Lovvom v. Johnston, 118 F.(2d) 704 (C. C. A. 9th 1941), ccrt. de-
nied, 314 U. S. 607 (1941), DeMaurez v. Swope, 104 F.(2d) 758 (C. C. A. 9th 1939).?IBoylan v. Huff, 121 F. (2d) 865, 872 (App. D. C. 1941), cf., Cochran v. Kansas,
316 U. S. 255 (1941).
72 Since m the ordinary case the court will not proceed without the accused, and
since voluntary absence from the trial after it has begun is generally a waiver, it is
difficult to prove violation of this right. Although the rules against hearsay are related
to the right, erroneous admnistration of them does not defeat jurisdiction of the
trial court. See Curtis v. Rives, 123 F.(2d) 936 (App. D. C. 1941), Burgess v. King,
130 F(2d) 761 (C. C. A. 8th 1942), Moore v. Aderhold, supra, note 21, Diaz v. U. S.,
223 U. S. 442 (1911), Salinger v. U. S., 272 U. S. 542 (1926), Gonzales v. People of
Virgin Islands, 109 F.(2d) 215 (C. C. A. 3d 1940), U. S. v. Barracota, 45 F Supp.
38 (S. D. N. Y. 1942), Fukunaga v. Territory of Hawaii, 33 F.(2d) 396 (C. C. A.
9th 1929).
7sThese requirements may be summed up as follows: The trial should proceed
in an orderly manner with reasonable dispatch (but failure of accused to insist on
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cannot be enforced unless the infraction of them is sufficient to violate
due process. The circuit courts of appeal"' have followed the reasomng
advanced by Judge Miller in Dorsey v. Gill, supra, and the Supreme
Court has not so far chosen to upset that interpretation. An exhaustive
search has failed to disclose a case where violation of the requirement
that defendant be given compulsory process for obtaining his wit-
nesses has been successfully established as a ground for relief under
habeas corpus, though it has been alleged in a number of cases.7 1 It is
nevertheless clear that an actual infringement of this right will defeat
the jurisdiction of the trial court.71
The outstanding example of a specific right which may be protected
by habeas corpus proceedings in the nature of a collateral attack on
the judgment, apart from the general question of due process, is the
right to counsel. Perhaps because the Zerbst case, supra, was first in
point of time or because of the realization on the part of courts of the
impossibility of a fair trial, in many cases, without counsel, more cases
have been based upon this constitutional right than any other. The Sixth
Amendment7" provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
expedition at time of the delay is a waiver). Ex parte Pickerall, 44 F Supp. 741
(N. D. Tex. 1942) Bayless v. U. S., supra, note 36. It should be public but exclusion
of spectators from trial for a sex crime would not defeat the court of jurisdiction.
Sawyer v. Duffy. 60 F Supp. 852 (N. D. Cal. 1945), but cf., Tanksley v. U. S., 145
F.(2d) 58 (C. C. A. 9th 1944), 156 A. L. R. 257 The jury should consist of twelve
men, neither more nor less. Patton v. U. S., 281 276 (1930), Adams v. U. S. ex rel.
McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942), and see Rule 23, Federal Rules of Crimunal Pro-
cedure. In regard to alternate jurors, see 28 U. S. C. A. 417 (a), Robinson v. U. S.,
144 F.(2d) 392 (C. C. A. 6th 1944), aff'd, 324 U. S. 282 (1945), rehearing denied, 324
U. S. 889, 325 U. S. 895 (1945). The trial should be in the presence and under the
supervision of a judge having the power to instruct the jurors as to the law and advise
them as to the facts. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1 (1899). The verdict of
the jury should be unanimous. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 586 (1900).
4 McMullen v. Squier, 144 F.(2d) 703 (C. C. A. 9th 1944), Eury v. Huff, 141
F. (2d) 554 (C. C. A. 4th 1944), Walker v. Chitty, .upra, note 25.
75 Smith v. Squier, 136 F. (2d) 536 (C. C. A. 9th 1943), Bell v. Johnston, 152
F.(2d) 59 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), Brown v. Johnston, 126 F.(2d) 727 (C. C. A. 9th
1942), In re Curtiss, 36 F Supp. 408 (D. C. 1941), affd, 123 F.(2d) 936 (App.
D. C. 1941).
7 Refusal of such process smacks of such prejudice upon the part of the court as
to constitute denial of due process. See 18 U. S. C. A. 563, Rule 17, Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13 F Supp. 253 (N. D. Ga. 1935),
aff'd, 92 F.(2d) 748 (C. C. A. 5th 1937), reversed (on other grounds), 304 U. S. 458(1938). But failure of accused to make it clear to the court that he wvants process to
be served upon a particular person is a waiver. Smith v. Squier, 136 F. (2d) 536
(C. C. A. 9th 1943) , Wallace v. Hunter, supra, note 25. Moreover, the right is limited
to reasonable demands which are not deliberately postponed until justice would be
unnecessarily delayed. Casebeer v. Hudspeth, 121 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 10th 1941) ,
Neufield v. U. 5., 118 F.(2d) 375, 385 (App. D. C. 1941), cf Paoni v. U. S., 281
Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 3d 1922).
77 Although the right to counsel might be considered as protected by the Fifth
Amendment due process clause as it is under the Fourteenth, there is no i,ecessity
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shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fense," which means that if the accused has no money to employ
counsel and does not waive the right the court must appoint counsel
for him."8 But as we have already noted, an accused cannot have
counsel forced upon him, and may, if he chooses, defend himself79 or
offer no defense whatever, but the waiver of the right to counsel must
be intelligent and understanding."0 This is true regardless of the plea
which the accused may make and a plea of guilty is only a circum-
stance which serves to indicate a waiver of the right.' The reasoning
of the Supreme Court was made clear m Williams v. Kaser12 where
the court said:
Like other judgments, a judgment based on a plea of guilty is not of
course to be lightly impeached in collateral proceedings. But a plea of
guilty to a capital offense made by one who asked for counsel but could not
obtain one and who was "incapable adequately of making his own defense"
stands on a different footing. Robbery in the first degree by means of a
deadly weapon is a capital offense in Missouri. The law of Missouri has
important distinctions between robbery in the first degree, robbery in the
second degree, grand larceny, and petit larceny These involve technical
requirements of the indictment or information, the land of evidence re-
quired for conviction, the instructions necessary to define the several ele-
ments of the crime, and the various defenses which are available. These are
a closed book to the average layman. These considerations underscore
what was said in Powell v. Alabama: "Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime he is incapable, generally of determining for himself whether
the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.
Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant
to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one " Those observations are as pertinent in connection with the ac-
for recurring to it. But cf. Sanders v. Allen, 100 F. (2d) 717 (App. D. C. 1938), Hall
v. Johnston, supra, note 53, Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F Supp. 414, 422 (S. D. Ga. 1942),
aff'd, 131 F.(2d) 110 (C. C. A. 5th 1942), cert. densed, 318 U. S. 759 (1943).
78 "If the defendant appears in court without counsel the court shall advise him of
is right to counsel and assign counsel to represent im at every stage of the pro-
ceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel." Rule
44, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule restates existing law. Glasser v.
U. S., 315 U. S. 60 (1942), Johnston v. Zerbst, supra, note 40; Walker v. Johnston,
supra, note 7 See Betts v. Brady, supra, note 51, and the annotation in 146 A. L. R. 378.
79"In all the courts of the United States the parties may plead and manage their
own causes personally." 28 U. S. C. A. 394.
so Cases cited, supra, note 78, and Carter v. Illinois, supra, note 47
81 Carter v. Illinois, td., Rice v. Olsen, Williams v. Kaiser, supra, note 10.
82 Carter v. Illinois, supra, note 47
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cused's plea as they are in the conduct of a trial. The decision to plead
guilty is a decision to allow a judgment of conviction to be entered without
a hearing-a decision which is irrevocable and which forecloses any possi-
bility of establishing innocence. If we assume that petitioner committed a
crime, we cannot know the degree of prejudice which the denial of counsel
caused. Only counsel could discern from the facts whether a plea of not
guilty to the offense charged or a plea of guilty to a lesser offense would
be appropriate.
And so, a failure to appoint counsel upon request would clearly be a
breach of the constitutional rights of the accused even though he later
pleads guilty-but a failure to advise him of his right to counsel, where
he is aware of his rights, will not be prejudicial.8 However, a failure
to request the court to appoint counsel is not, alone, a waiver," for
the accused must be aware of his rights and understand his situation
before he can waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.
Where the accused pleads guilty, however, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals has often held that he thereby impliedly waives his right
to the assistance of counsel, and upon a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus the petitioner must rebut this presumption."5 Other circuits
have not gone so far, feeling that the implication of the Supreme Court
decisions will not permit such a presumption. 8 There is, however,
actually no difference in these holdings, since the burden of proof is
always upon the petitioner and the result will be the same whatever
language is employed in the rationale.
It is safe to conclude that in any case, where m the trial of an ac-
cused, counsel was not appointed to represent him, whether or not he
pleaded guilty, there is an excellent chance of upsetting the judgment
through the offices of a writ of habeas corpus, unless the record of the
trial clearly shows that the accused was a mature, well-educated, in-
telligent man, fully advised of his rights, who, at the time of the trial,
acted in such a manner as to clearly indicate his intention to waive the
right to have counsel to advise him.
The right to be represented by counsel is substantial, and the law
88 O'Keith v. Johnston, 129 F.(2d) 889 (C. C. A. 9th 1942), 146 F.(2d) 230
(C. C. A. 9th 1944).
84 "[Waiver] must depend in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding the case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused."
Johnston v. Zerbst, supra, note 40.85 Michener v. Johnston, 141 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 9th 1944), Widmer v. Johnston,
supra, note 45, O'Keith v. Johnston, supra, note 83, Walker v. Chitty, supra, note 44,
Harpin v. Johnston, 109 F.(2d) 434 (C. C. A. 9th 1944).
88 Evans v. Rives, 126 F. (2d) 633 (App. D. C. 1942) and cases there cited.
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will not be satisfied by a mere sham appointment."7 However, where
the accused is represented by counsel of his own choice, he will not,
except in most extraordinary circumstances," be heard to complain."
But where counsel is appointed to represent him, the representation
so afforded must be "effective, 90 .e., able, efficient, competent, and
honorable. At the same time it is clear that no right of the accused
under the Sixth Amendment is violated unless the trial judge, in
appointing counsel, knew, or had reason to know, that the attorney ap-
pointed would not properly represent the accused. "All the Amend-
ment requires is that the accused shall have the assistance of counsel.' 9
"It does not mean that the constitutional rights of the defendant are
impaired by counsel's nustakes subsequent to a proper appointment.""
Every attorney makes mistakes whether he be young and inexperienced
or old and wise; but any attorney admitted to the bar and appointed
by the court is presumed to be competent,9 8 and he is normally as well
able to represent the accused as any other, for, theoretically at least,
our courts of justice decide cases upon their merits and not upon the
abilities of opposing counsel."'
However, the right to counsel is inextricably tied in with the whole
concept of due process of law and no matter how skilled the attorney
so appointed may be, if it should become apparent to the trial judge
that he is not diligently defending the accused, then it is the duty of
the trial court to stop the trial, appoint another attorney and, if neces-
s:7 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 446 (1940).
8 As perhaps where the prisoner later discovered evidence that proved that Is
own attorney, the judge, and the prosecuting attorney conspired to convict him. and in
collusion did effect such conviction.89 Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.(2d) 101 (C. C. A. 5th 1944), cert. denied, 324
U. S. 874 (1945), Pierce v. Hudspeth, 126 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 10th 1942), Hudspeth
v. McDonald, 120 F.(2d) 962 (C. C. A. 10th 1941), cert. deened, 314 U. S. 617 (1941),
Ex parte Haumsesch, 82 F.(2d) 558 (C. C. A. 9th 1936).90 Tomnans v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485 (1945), Glasser v. U. S., supra, note 78,
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), Johnson v. U. S., 110 F.(2d) 562 (App.
D. C. 1940), Thomas v. District of Columbia, 90 F.(2d) 424 (App. D. C. 1937).01 " Every person who is indicted of treason or other capital crime, shall be allowed
to make his full defense by counsel learned m the law; and the court before wluch he
is tried, or some judge thereof, shall immediately, upon Ins request, assign to him such
counsel, not exceeding two, as he may desire, and they shall have free access to him
at all seasonable hours. " 18 U. S. C. A. 563. This provision confers a right which
is only statutory and its violation does not give a ground for the writ. See Crum v.
Hunter, 151 F.(2d) 359 (C. C. A. 10th 1945).2onsv. Huff, 152 F. (2d) 14, 15 (App. D. C. 1945), Crum v. Hunter, .supra,
note 91, Diggs v. Welch, 148 F. (2d) 667, 669 (App. D. C. 1945), U. S. v. Gutterman,
147 F (2d) 540 (C. C. A. 2d 1945), Conley v. Cox, 138 F.(2d) 786 (C. C ~
8th 1943).
98See Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F. (2d) 989, 992 (C. C. A. 7th 1941), for an excellent
discussion.
9' Ibid., p. 993
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sary, grant a new trial. A failure in this duty by the trial judge would
violate our fundamental ideas of fairness and right, would render the
whole trial a farce and a mockery, and would, therefore, be in viola-
tion of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Taking the
two constitutional provisions together we can see the concept of
"effective counsel" much more clearly It is apparent that the court
may not appoint a single attorney to represent more than one co-
defendant where their interests may conflict, nor impose any other
burden upon the attorney which will prevent him from presenting the
best defense possible."5 Even if counsel is competent, his representa-
tion of the accused cannot be "effective" unless he is given sufficient
time to prepare his case," and a proper opportunity to communicate
and consult privately with the accused."' To deny counsel either is to
deprive the accused of "effective" representation and will be grounds
for the subsequent issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. But a mere
showing that the counsel appointed committed some error in the trial
of the case does not render the judgment of conviction void, nor
require the issuance of the writ.9" The petitioner must show that the
court or the prosecution has in some way participated in the injustice
complained of to invoke the due process clause. Otherwise the errors
of counsel can only be part of the risk of litigation.
The time aspect of the scope of inquiry by habeas corpus was con-
sidered above in connection with the right of confrontation and
grand jury hearings under Amendments Five and Six, as to whether
the inquiry could go into the facts of the appeal or probe into the pro-
cedure at the preliminary hearings. This problem has been most fully
considered with respect to the right to counsel, which has been declared
to be the right to have the assistance of counsel "at every step in the
proceeding."9 This statement is too broad. A failure to appoint coun-
sel at a preliminary proceeding does not violate either due process
Or Glasser v. U. S., supra, note 78, Noble v. Eicher, 143 F. (2d) 1001 (App. D. C.
1944), see also Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Malinski v. N. Y., 324 U. S.
401 (1945), and the annotation in 148 A. L. R. 183. Cf. Farris v. Hunter, 144 F. (2d)
63 (C. C. A. 10th 1944).98 House v. Mayo, supra, note 10; Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (1940), cf.
Powell v. Alabama, supra, note 90.
97" and they shall have free access to him at all seasonable hours." Supra,
note 91. See annotations in 23 A. L. R. 1382, 54 A. L. R. 1225.
98 Dorsey v. Gill, supra, note 56, cf. Thompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.(2d) 95 (C. C. A.
6th 1944), cert. dented, 324 U. S. 869 (1945) , Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.(2d) 101
(C. C. A. 5th 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 874 (1945), and the cases cited supra,
note 92.
99 Powell v. Alabama, supra, note 90.
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under the Fifth Amendment nor the right to counsel under the Sixth,
since a preliminary hearing is not required, and in any event the
accused is not thereby, in any true sense, prejudiced."' Where the
accused pleads guilty he is entitled to counsel at the arraignment, but
if he pleads not guilty, and subsequently counsel is appointed to repre-
sent him at the trial, the error of refusing hin counsel at the arraign-
ment is held to be cured, either upon the theory of implied waiver or
upon the theory of the absence of prejudice10 The absence of counsel
during the course of the trial proper, for any substantial period of
time, is presumed to be prejudicial and violative of the constitutional
rights of the accused, but a very short absence which could not have
prejudiced the accused will not defeat the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Where the attorney is absent when the jury returned its verdict,
the accused is not prejudiced,o° but where the absence occurs at the
time when sentence is pronounced, the attorney may in some way be
of assistance to the court-may be able to protect rights of the ac-
cused-and if the trial then proceeds, it is without jurisdiction to
sentence the accused.' But in such a case, upon a writ of habeas
corpus, the prisoner will not be discharged but only remanded to the
trial court for re-sentencing. This procedure is of doubtful validity,
but since the various circuits are independent jurisdictions, it is the
law for prisoners incarcerated at Alcatraz, Columbia, and McNeil
Island.'
Upon the basis of comments already made it would seem that here
the constitutional guaranty of the right to counsel probably stops-at
least msofar as it is protected by the writ of habeas corpus.' It has
been asserted with some success that an accused is entitled to counsel
in making an appeal, but to many appellate judges this suggestion has
100 U. S. v. McDonnell, 130 F.(2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 7th 1942), Burall v. Johnston,
sispra, note 69; of. Anderson v. Treat, 172 U. S. 24 (1898).
toIn re Reed, 158 F.(2d) 323 (App. D. C. 1946).
102 Kent v. Sanford, 121 F.(2d) 216 (C. C. A. 5th 1941), cert. denied, 315 U. S.
799 (1942), Lovvorn v. Johnston, srupra, note 70.
10 Coates v. Lawrence, supra, note 77, Wilfong v. Johnston, 156 F. (2d) 507
(C. C. A. 9th 1946). Notice that these cases conflict in principle with the cases cited
sispra, note 102, but tis inconsistency seems to be settled. The better rule would seem
to be that in all cases where counsel is temporarily absent, the accused must show that
he was prejudiced and that he did not acquiesce in the attorney's absence. Lovvorn v.
Johnston, supra, note 70; Taylor v. Hudspeth, 113 F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 10th 1940),
Moore v. Aderhold, supra, note 21, DeMaurez v. Swope, supra, note 70.
10 Wilfong v. Johnston, supra, note 103.
105 Dorsey v. Gill, supra, note 56 at p. 877, Osborne v. Johnston, 120 F. (2d) 947(C. C. A. 9th 1941), Lovvorn v. Johnston, supra, note 70; Errington v. Hudspeth,
110 F.(2d) 384 (C. C. A. 10th 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 638 (1940), Moore v.
Aderhold, supra, note 21, DeMaurez v. Swope, .supra, note 70.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
seemed improper and unsound in law The right to take an appeal has
been said many times to be only a "matter of grace" and not guar-
anteed by due process."'8 Nonetheless, it has been argued that Congress
by providing for appeals has set up a procedure and has established a
form of due process which every defendant is entitled to exercise. That
is, the appeal is but a "step in the proceedings" and the accused, there-
fore, has a right to the assistance of counsel in taking of an appeal.07
Even if the argument be accepted, it is necessary for the petitioner to
show that he was prejudiced, s.e., that there was some reversible error
committed in the trial of his case, else the court will not issue the writ
to set aside the valid judgment.0 '
In summary then, we may state the limitations upon the use of
habeas corpus for collateral attack upon federal judgments as follows:
i. The inquiry is limited in time to that period beginning with the
arraignment up to and including judgment and sentence, excluding
all things that went before, such as procedure before the grand jury
or a preliminary hearing, and all things that come after, such as the
conduct of an appeal.
2. The writ may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, to set
aside a judgment for mere errors of law, though where administrative
action, as distinguished from a judgment, is involved, it may be a
device for judicial review (subject to limitations outside the scope of
this article)
3. The inquiry is limited in substance to confinements which are
presently illegal because the sentencing court:
(a) lacked jurisdiction from the beginning; or
(b) having jurisdiction in the beginning has proceeded to judgment
in a manner which not only violates some constitutionally guar-
anteed right, but is obviously so unfair and unjust as to deny
due process of law; or
(c) having jurisdiction in the beginning has denied the accused the
"effective" assistance of counsel.
108 Cobbledich v. U. S., stupra, note 70, at p. 325, U. S. v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310
(1892).
107 Cochran v. Kansas, supra, note 71, Frank v. Mangum, supra, note 8, Boykin
v. Huff, supra, note 71, and see Judge Denman, dissenting in Thompson v. Johnston,
160 F. (2d) 374 (C. C. A. 9th 1947).
108 Thompson v. Johnston, %d., Miller v. Sanford, 59 F Supp. 812 (N. D. Ga. 1945),
aff'd, 150 F.(2d) 637 (C. C. A. 5th 1945), cert. dented, 326 U. S. 787 (1946).
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PROCEDURE
So far we have confined our inquiries to the substantive rights that
can be protected with the writ of habeas corpus. The remainder of this
article is to be concerned with matters of procedure-the requirements
of the petition as to form, the action of the district court upon receipt
of a petition, and the difficulties presented upon appeal.
Most of the problems have arisen out of the fact that in nearly all
cases the convict is not represented by counsel but instead acts for
himself. Because he is generally an uneducated layman, the courts
have found it impossible to demand of hun the "technical niceties"',"
of pleading, and therefore a petition for habeas corpus need not be in
any particular form though certain essentials, succinctly set out by
the statute, must be present.1 0 The petition must be in writing, signed
and verified by the person detained, 1" setting forth all known facts of
the detention, and addressed to any judge or court authorized by law
to issue the writ."2
A petition directed in the first instance to the Supreme Court or to
any judge thereof will be denied without prejudice and the petitioner
referred to the appropriate district court."' A petition directed, in the
first instance, to the circuit court of appeals will be dismssed for want
of jurisdiction because of lack of statutory power. If directed, how-
ever, to a specific judge thereof, he may act upon it himself,"' or he
may refer it to the district court."' Finally, where a petition is directed
10 Tomkins v. Missouri, supra, note 46; Walker v. Johnston, supra, note 7,
Sisquoc Ranch Co. v. Roth, 153 F. (2d) 437 (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
120 "Application for writ of habeas corpus shall be made into the court of justice, or
judge authorized to issue the same, by complaint in writing, signed by the person for
whose relief it is intended, setting forth the facts concerning the detention of the party
restrained, in whose custody he is detained, and by virtue of what claim or authority,
if known. The facts set forth in the complaint shall be verified by the oath of the
person making the application." 28 U. S. C. A. 454. See also Dorsey v. Gill, supra,
note 56, at pp. 867-9.
"'l The "next friend" of the prisoner may verify the complaint if it shows why
it was not verified by the person detained and what relation the "next friend" bears
to the prisoner, to the satisfaction of the court. U. S. ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273
Fed. 915 (C. C. A. 2d 1921), U. S. v. Watchorn, 164 Fed. 152 (S. D. N. Y. 1908).
But see McDonald v. Hudspeth, 113 F.(2d) 984 (C. C. A. 10th 1940), cert. dented,
311 U. S. 683 (1940).
112 Three statutory provisions are controlling. One of them gives the Supreme Court
and the district courts power to issue the writ. The second gives such power to anyjudge of the district, circuit, or supreme courts within their respective jurisdictions.
The third confers upon the various courts a general power to issue necessary and
proper writs. 28 U. S. C. A. 451, 452, and 377
".SEx parte Hawk, supra, note 10; Ex parte Henry Hawk, 318 U. S. 746 (1943).
"'4E.g., Johnston v. Wright, 137 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 9th 1943).
125Its re Gersing, 145 F. (2d) 481 (App. D. C. 1944), Sweetney v. Johnston, 121
F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 9th 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 607 (1941) , Brosius v.
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to a specific district judge (where there is more than one judge in the
district), it may be acted upon by him personally or may be placed
upon the court calendar and acted upon by the judge who happens to
draw it, for the petitioner has no vested right to have a particular
judge hear his application.1 ' It follows, therefore, that the best prac-
tice in the ordinary case is to present the petition in the first instance
to the district court for the district wherein the petitioner is confined.
When the petition is presented to the district judge for his consid-
eration, he has the duty to consider it carefully, exercising his sound
discretion and disregarding "technical niceties,""" and to "forthwith
award the writ unless it appears from the petition itself that the party
is not entitled thereto,"" s or unless it appears that the time for appeal
has not passed, or that the petitioner has another adequate remedy '"
From ancient practice and judicial interpretation certain rules have
been evolved to aid the judge in satisfying the requirements of the
statute. In a doubtful case, he may require the petitioner to amend
his petition so as to show the facts more clearly, 2' or to show whether
a prior application was made, and if so, what action was had upon it; "I'
or he may issue an order to show cause why the writ should not issue,
and then, taking the petition, the answer, and the reply together, deter-
mine whether the petition for the writ is sufficient upon its face.'
In determining the sufficiency of the petition all of the facts alleged
by the petitioner must be regarded as true, no matter how farfetched
and unlikely they may appear to be."' So if the petition alleges facts
which make the confinement presently illegal (keeping in mind the
principles we have previously discussed), the judge must issue the
writ and give the prisoner an opportunity to prove his allegations at
a hearing."
Botkin, 110 F.(2d) 49 (App. D. C. 1940), Whittaker v. Johnston, 85 F.(2d) 199
(C. C. A. 9th 1936), Ex Parte Haumesch, 82 F. (2d) 558 (C. C. A. 9th 1936), cf.
Banks v. O'Grady, 113 F.(2d) 926 (C. C. A. 8th 1940).
1.1 Burall v. Johnston, supra, note 69; Snow v. Roche, supra, note 10; Rutkowsla
v. St. Sure, 143 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 9th 1944).
117 See note 109.
118 28 U. S. C. A. 455.
119 Boylan v. Huff, supra, note 71, Walker v. Chitty, supra, note 44.
120 Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U. S. 342, 350 (1941), Dorsey v. Gill, supra, note 56.
121 Salinger v. Loisel, supra, note 29; Dorsey v. Gill, supra, note 56.
122ES parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546 (1941), Walker v. Johnston, supra, note 7,
at p. 284.
123 Ibid., at p. 287
124 Ibid., at p. 285, see also Waley v. Johnston, supra, note 60.
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The doctrine of res ]udicata is not applicable to habeas corpus
cases,"" but the Ninth Circuit, which has several large penitentiaries
and has been especially burdened with the work of "prison lawyers"
who make a game of filing petitions to while away the dreary time in
prison, has been compelled to advance a substitute for res judicata.
In Swihart v. Johnston,"' the rule was advanced that a previous appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus was grounds for the district court
to deny, in the exercise of its sound discretion, a subsequent petition,
for the petitioner in withholding the information (relied upon m the
second petition) from the first petition was making an "abusive use"
of the writ within the meaning of the language in Salinger v. Lotsel'l7
where the Supreme Court said:
In practice the rules we here have outlined will accord to the writ of
habeas corpus its recognized status as a privileged writ of freedom, and yet
make against an abusive use of it. As a further safeguard against abuse the
court, if not otherwise informed, may on receiving an application for the
writ require the applicant to show whether he has made a prior application
and, if so, what action was had on it.
Here the prior refusal to discharge was by a court of coordinate juris-
diction and was affirmed in a considered opinion by a Circuit Court of
Appeals. Had the District Court disposed of the later application on that
ground, its discretion would have been well exercised and we should sus-
tain its action without saying more.
Perhaps with the thought that the Salinger case, supra, was still
good law, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in the Swihart
case, and when in several subsequent cases the doctrine was reaffirmed,
continued to refuse to take a position .12  However, cases like Waley
v. Johnston29 and Robnson v. Johnston80 seem to indicate that the
Swihart and companion cases were incorrectly decided. Nonetheless,
125 Ibid., at p. 105, Salinger v. Loisel, "pra, note 29.
128 150 F.(2d) 721 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 789 (1946). See
the opinion of Justice Field sitting as a Circuit Judge in Ex parte Cuddy, 40 Fed.
62 (D. C. Cal. 1889) for the origin of the reasomng of the Swihart case.
127 Supra, note 29. The court reaffirmed two considerations as appropriate when
there has been a refusal to discharge on a prior application based on similar grounds;
the character of the court or officer to whom the first application was made and the
fullness with which it was considered. The rule against application of res judicata
was said to have been altered by the introduction of the right to appellate review of
refusal to discharge on habeas corpus.
128 Garrison v. Johnston, 151 F.(2d) 1011 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), cert. denied, 66
Sup. Ct. 1009 (1946), Wilson v. Johnston, 154 F.(2d) 111 (C. C. A. 9th 1946),
cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 1366 (1946), McMahon v. Johnston, 157 F. (2d) 915 (C. C.
A. 9th 1945), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 1197 (1947). Cf. Kerr v. Squier, 151 F.(2d)
308 (C. C. A. 9th 1945).
120 Supra, note 124.
1so 316 U. S. 649 (1941), see also Walker v. Johnston, supra, note 7
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the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, in Price v. Johnston,"'8 has just
reaffirmed its rule, although the strong dissents filed by Judge Denman
and Judge Stephens demonstrate the views held by many other federal
judges.
If the petition is sufficient on its face, and no problem is raised by
denial of a previous application based on similar grounds, the judge
must issue the writ." '2 As already noted the writ is an order of the
court, to the person in whose custody the petitioner is detained, requir-
ing him to produce the body of the petitioner in court within a time
set by law '" Upon making the return, the respondent shall produce
the petitioner and shall certify to the court the true cause of the deten-
tion." '8 The court shall then set a day, not more than five days there-
after, for a hearing of the facts.' Upon the hearing the petitioner
must be actually present before the district court, and a hearing before
a commissioner within the prison will not satisfy the requirements of
the statute.' The judge must hear the evidence, the testimony, and
the arguments and then proceed in a summary way to deternune the
facts of the case."' Since the habeas corpus is a civil proceeding,'"
the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are not applicable and the
petitioner may be required to testify,' is not entitled to a jury trial,'"0
1s 161 F.(2d) 705 (C. C. A. 9th 1947), cert. granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 1757 (1947).
The dissenting opinions, 161 F.(2d) 705, 708, 711 are able briefs in support of peti-
tioner, but if reversal follows, the settlement of many meritorious disputes will be
seriously delayed by the flood of petitions of proven scoundrels. These "repeaters"
cannot lawfully be restrained by the prison authorities from this kind of attempt at
self-deliverance, Ex parte Hull, supra, note 122, and many wardens encourage such
activities as a salutary diversion. For example, Harmon Waley (who pleaded guilty
to kidnapping the Weyerhaeuser boy), at present confined in Alcatraz, has just sub-
mitted his fifteenth petition, and one prisoner submitted fifty petitions in five years.
Dorsey v. Gill, supra, note 56. Whatever the strength of the Stihart rule, or the
outcome of the pending review, it seems that a practical adjustment ought to be made
in terms of discretion of the deciding court to determine whether the prisoner has
acted with due diligence to bring the matter on which he rests his application to the
attention of the court. See Salinger v. Loisel, supra, note 127 Appellate review should
be confined to abuse of such discretion.
182 See note 124.
188 Three, ten, and twenty days, depending upon distances. 28 U. S. C. A. 456.
'8 28 U. S. C. A. 457, 458.
185 The petitioning party may request a longer time. 28 U. S. C. A. 459. It is not
necessary that the hearing be completed within five days, but only that it be begun.
O'Keith v. Johnston, supra, note 83.
186 Holiday v. Johnston, supra, note 120.
1'7 28 U. S. C. A. 461.
188 Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 556 (1883), Burgess v. King, 130 F. (2d) 761
(C. C. A. 8th 1942). See extensive citation of authority in note 77 of Dorsey v. Gill,
supra, note 56, at p. 870.
'8 King v. Smith, 158 F.(2d) 715 (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
140 O'Keith v. Johnston, supra, note 83.
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is not entitled to confront the witnesses against him (can use deposi-
tions) ' and is not entitled to appointment of counsel as a matter of
right,"' though the court may appoint counsel if it so desires.
Moreover, since the petitioner is making an attack upon a judgment
of record which is presumed to be valid, the burden of proof is upon
him to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. The
petitioner's own unsupported statements will rarely, if ever, sustain
that burden and as a practical matter very few petitioners can ever
prove their usually wishful allegations.
Although the field of habeas corpus is expressly excluded from the
operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except upon
appeal," ' the statutes controlling the procedure are not inconsistent
with Rule 52 (a) (as to findings of fact) and it has therefore been
considered as applicable and controlling. The district judge has there-
fore the duty to make findings of fact, and if he fails to do so, the
appellate court may send the case back for findings.14 However, it is
immaterial whether these findings of fact are correctly labeled or not.
They may be contained in the conclusions of law or in an opinion by
the trial judge, and it is enough that the material facts are deter-
mined." '
Having held the hearing, determined the facts of the case, and made
his findings of fact, the district judge must then dispose of the peti-
tioner "as law and justice require." ' If the allegations are untrue and
the confinement of the petitioner is not shown to be unlawful, then
the judge should forthwith remand him to the custody of the respond-
ent warden. If, on the other hand, the petitioner has borne the burden
of proof and proved his allegations, the judge should do what the law
seems to require in the particular case. Normally where a prisoner has
shown that the conviction was void because his constitutional rights
were violated in the course of the trial, the court will remand the
prisoner to confinement for a limited time to give the authorities an
141 ,Ewns v. Johnston, 112 F.(2d) 451 (C. C. A. 9th 1940) and cases there cited.
Cf. Burgess v. King, supra, note 138.
142 King v. Smith, supra, note 139; Hodge v. Huff, 140 F. (2d) 686 (App. D. C.
1944), Dorsey v. Gill, supra, note 56; Brown v. Johnston, 91 F.(2d). 370 (C. C. A.
9th 1937), Benton v. Hill, 72 F.(2d) 827 (App. D. C. 1926), cf. Potter v. Dowd,
146 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 7th 1944).
1, Rule 81.144 Michener v. Johnston, &upra, note 85, Curtiss v. Rives, supra, note 72, Hall v.
Johnston, 91 F.(2d) 363 (C. C. A. 9th 1937).
143 Johnston v. Wright, supra, note 114, O'Keith v. Johnston, supra, note 83, at
p. 890.
146 See 28 U. S. C. A. 461, which provides for a summary manner of determination
and disposition of "the party as law and justice require."
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opportunity to institute the necessary proceedings to try lm over
again.' In the case of a defective sentence, it may remand him to the
sentencing court for resentencing. 1' s Of course, where he has served
the full lawful period of his confinement and is now entitled to his
freedom, he will be immediately released.'49
After the district court has rendered its decision in the matter, either
the petitioner or the respondent may appeal to the Circuit Court of
Appeals.' If the decision was against the respondent and he takes
an appeal, the prisoner is remanded to confinement until the appeal
is decided.
On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals may appoint counsel to
represent petitioner but is not in any sense bound to.'" Nor is the
petitioner entitled to appear and represent himself. Many prisoners
wishing to present their own cases before the appellate court have
relied upon 28 U S. C. A. 394, which provides that a party may man-
age and plead his own cause personally, and several were brought
before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for that
purpose.' 2 However, the court sitting en banc in Prnce v. Johnston,'"
held that the appellate court has no power to issue such an order. If in
some way the issuing of a writ of habeas corpus to bring the prisoner
before it is "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," then the appellate
court would have the power,'' but the court could not see that oral
argument by the petitioner was in any way necessary to the exercise
of jurisdiction upon his appeal. It now is clear that a convict cannot
get out of prison to argue his own case upon appeal.
Upon appeal the findings of the district court as to the facts will not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, this rule being presently based
upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 (a) ' It follows
therefore that the chief bone of contention in the appellate courts is
247 See Mitchell v. Youell, 130 F. (2d) 880 (C. C. A. 4th 1942), McCleary v.
Hudspeth, 124 F.(2d) 445 (C. C. A. 10th 1941), cert. den ed, 316 U. S. 670 (1942).
148Wilfong v. Johnston, supra, note 103, cf. Terrell v. Biddle, 139 F.(2d) 32
(C. C. A. 8th 1943), cert. densed, 321 U. S. 794 (1944).
149 Johnston v. Wright, supra, note 114.
150 28 U. S. C. A. 463.
151 Pyle v. Johnston, 136 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 9th 1943), Dorsey v. Gill, mstpra,
note 56, at p. 870. Most appeals are taken in forma pauperis and are governed by the
requirements of 28 U. S. C. A. 832 et seq. See Thiel v. So. Pac. R. R., supra, note 31,
and Smith v. Johnston, 109 F.(2d) 152 (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
152 Giles, King and Price in cases cited rupra, notes 131, 139 and Giles v. U. S.,
157 F.(2d) 588 (C. C. A. 9th 1946).
158 159 F.(2d) 234 (C. C. A. 9th 1947).
154 See note 112.
155 Davis v. Johnston, 157 F.(2d) 64 (C. C. A. 9th 1946), Albert v. Patterson,
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as to what allegations of fact are sufficient to require the issuance of
the writ, and most cases appealed are those where the petition for the
writ was demed without a hearing. Although petitioners have taken
many such appeals successfully, it is only very rarely that the peti-
tioner can sustain the burden of proof when he faces the trial judge at
the hearing."'
The petitioner often makes statements of fact in his brief upon
appeal that supplement the findings of fact or the allegations made in
his petition. Where the district court has held a hearing and made
findings of fact, these additions are to be ignored. But where the dis-
trict court has denied the petition as being insufficient upon its face,
the question arises whether the petitioner should be permitted to
amend his petition. The decisions have not always faced the problem
resolutely and the law is not entirely certain. The normal policy of
the law for the orderly administration of justice would require that
the petitioner be restricted upon appeal to the facts alleged in his
petition to the court below; but in habeas corpus matters, especially
where the petitioner represents himself, the policy of the law requires
that all formalities shall be dispensed with in order to give swift relief
where required. The circuit courts have so far, however, generally
refused to permit such amendments, and to the writer at least it seems
clear that the petitioner should be limited upon appeal to those matters
which the district court had before it.""
Review of the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals may be had
by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court exactly as in other cases, 5s
and in a very exceptional case the Supreme Court might be persuaded
to grant an original writ of habeas corpus. The present Supreme Court
has seemed inclined to review many more cases than their relative
importance would seem to justify, but he would be a hardy protagonist
who would nuimrze the value of careful supervision of the adminis-
tration of this great writ.
155 F.(2d) 429 (C. C. A. 1st 1946), Alexander v. Johnston, 137 F.(2d) 712, 713
(C. C. A. 9th 1943), Kelly v. Johnston, 128 F.(2d) 793, 794 (C. C. A. 9th 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 699 (1943).
150 For an example see Waley v. Johnston 38 F Supp. 408 (Cal: 1941), petition
denied without a hearing; affirmed, 124 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 9th 1941), reversed,
316 U. S. 101 (1942), hearing held as ordered and facts found (unreported) and
Waley remanded to prison, affirmed, 139 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 9th 1943), cert. dented,
321 U. S. 779 (1944).
157 Crockett v. Johnston, 109 F.(2d) 445 (C. C. A. 9th 1940), Seals v. Johnston,
95 F.(2d) 501 (C. C. A. 9th 1938), but cf. Lynch v. Johnston, 160 F.(2d) 950 (C. C.
A. 9th 1947), and Judge Denman, dissenting in Thompson v. Johnston, mtprq, note 107
158 28 U. S. C. A. 347, 348.
